So, right in the wake of Ross
Aderson's attack on
Chip-And-Pin comes another scary story, this time on the famous
RSA encryption scheme. Just as a quick detour, I will briefly go over the key concepts of private-/public-key cryptography. After which I will go over the attack and then the implications. Readers familiar with the concepts are welcome to skip over the next 4 paragraphs.
Private-key or symmetric cryptography involves 2 parties sharing some secret key
K (and obviously a cryptographic scheme). Party A can then encrypt a message
m, using
K and get the resulting encryption or
ciphertext c. This can then be
transmitted to Party B (details of transmission and the various attacks there-in are skipped). Once Party B has
received c then they can decrypt it using
K and read
m. Which is all fine and dandy, until you add in more people.
If you add in Party C to the system, then you need 2 more keys; 1 for A & C and 1 for B & C. IF you re-use the same key, then anybody can read the message, which is now what we want. As the system grows, the number of keys grows exponentially fast (for
n users, you need
(n(n-1))/2 keys). Even if you could generate and store that many keys, how do you give the keys to
everybody in a secure manner? This is called the key distribution problem, which motivated public-key cryptography.
Public-key or asymmetric
cyptography is based on the principal that every user creates 2
distinct but related keys, called the public key and private key. The public key, as the name suggests, is public and is published in "
telephone directory" of sorts (details skipped, this leads to a few open problems). The secret key is kept secret, as the name so aptly states. Now when party A wants to send
m to Party B, they look up B's public key in directory and encrypt it using that key and send
c as above. B can then decrypt
c using their secret key. "So that solves the problem, right?" Not quite, as public-key cryptography is much slower the private-key.
So this leads us naturally to a compromise: hybrid
encryption. The
principal is that you send 1 message using public-key cryptography, which contains a key for private-key cryptography. All communications from then onwards are done using private-key cryptography. Again this is just a brief idea, but should be
sufficient to appreciate the problems given below.
What this attack does (full paper can be found
here) is basically exploit a vulnerability that arises from the combination of hardware and software used to implement this scheme. As most of you are aware, computers have gotten really, really, REALLY fast. This is due to the fact that the transistors are getting smaller and smaller, hence allowing chip designers to fit more in the same space.
Of course, this leads to the problem of bit errors; as they are smaller and closer together small changes in voltage/current/magnetic field can cause a single bit to flip, which will then
propagate through the whole calculation. Having said that, there are solutions, which I really don't understand, so take my word for it, this problem is managed.
However you can still induce these errors, by passing a small, transient electrical pulse to the processor. These pulses last for less than 1 clock cycle, hence affecting at most 1 bit. Normally all
this would do is give you an
erroneous output, and be of no use to anybody, but this is where the software part comes in. This specific attack relies on the Fixed-Window Exponentiation (
FWE) algorithm being employed. I will not detail the algorithm, those curious can look it up in the paper (link give above) and read up further if they so choose.
The basic operation in
RSA is a single exponentiation, which is the message
m raised to the secret key
d (in standard
RSA notation), which is
md, modulo an
RSA modulus
N. Suffice to say, these calculations are not easy to perform on a chip and can be VERY SLOW. So there are several clever algorithms there that do these computations in an acceptable time, such as the
FWE. it basically split the binary representation of
d into "windows" and performs the calculations on that window and then moves on.
What the attack does, is induce a bit-error in the calculation, by send a small transient pulse, as described above. This generates a "broken" signature
s', which the
receiver will reject as incorrect. The attacker then gets broken signatures and based on some complex math, can start to extract single bits of the key. As the attacker learns more and more bits, it becomes easier to calculate the rest. I will at this point admit that even I am
at a loss as to exactly how this works (mainly due to not having
enough time to fully study the attack).
Although most people would think that this is just a theoretical result, but they did present the results of an experiment
as well. They set up a system using an
FPGA board running a
SPARC-based Linux system. They managed to recover the key in 104 hours, which just over 4 days. It must be noted that this was achieved using 81 machines
running a distributed algorithm, giving an estimated 1 year on a single system. Although, one must realise that most attackers would have control of several computers on which to run
their algorithm, thus making the distributed system attack plausible.
So you make think "Why do I care about this
RSA cryptography stuff?" Well simple, this is the basic scheme that is used in a hybrid key exchange as described above, to establish a secure connections. So if this attack is being run against you, after you have signed ~700 key-exchange messages, the attackers now know your private key.
But then you may think "700 messages is quite a lot!" Which in all fairness, for a single user, it probably is. But lets think of large corporations who on a daily basis engage in large numbers of secured connections with
their customers for financial
transactions(think of any medium to large e-retailer). Now they need to send signed certificates to large numbers of users (possibly in the
thousands). If you were able to run this attack against them, well that would be a problem.
I'm fairly sure you would not be able to achieve the speeds of attack presented in the paper due to certain practical considerations, but you would still be in a fairly comfortable place. Even if it took you 20days to crack any retailer's secret key,
that's not that bad. Once you have
their secret key, you can then impersonate them very easily.
Phising sites may look real, but cannot produce authentically signed certificates, which is where people sometimes catch on. With the secret key, you can sign certificates on behalf of the retailer and convince even the most aware and
conscious users that you are legitimate. "Please enter your card details" and fraud ensues.
But now we look at the slightly less scary point of view: it's still fairly hard. It depends on a software/hardware combination. It is no trivial task to determine if a certain site's servers use that combination. Even if one were in
possesion of such information,
reliably accessing the communications channels and performing this attack would be another
Herculean task. Furthermore, to remain in the spirit of this attack, one must do all of this
UNDETECTED, which is easier said than done.
So, although this could be a major problem for some people, there is a simple solution: change the software. This removes half the vulnerability, and may be
enough to
completely invalidate this attack.
Of course, you could
also change all your hardware, but this more costly and a tad more difficult. There could be issues of your new hardware not working well with your old hardware, amongst other things.
But as I always say, they're two sides to the security coin; there is also the issue that it takes them 100 hours to recover a 1024-bit secret key, if you use a larger key (2048-bits or for really secure things 4096-bit) the complexity of the attack, and thus the time required, greatly increases. Also certain keys can be revoked, albeit with some difficulties. (the key revocation problem in itself entails at least at 2hour lecture, so let's no go there.) Key compromise is not the end of the world, it may cost you some reputation and issues with repaying your customers, but it may not kill you.
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